

Matching Games


Computing the Nucleolus in Polynomial Time

By Justin Toth

Joint work with Jochen Könemann and Kanstantsin Pashkovich


University of Waterloo

Weighted Matching Games




- **Vertices:** Players
- **Edges:** Potential Collaborations
- Have \leq one collaborator
- Models Network Bargaining setting of [Kleinberg and Tardos '08]

Weighted Matching Games



- Value $\nu(S) = \max\{w(M) : M \text{ is a matching on } G[S]\}$
- $S \subseteq T \implies \nu(S) \leq \nu(T)$
- So assume the **grand coalition** forms.

Least Core




How to **fairly distribute** matching value to the players?

$$\sum_{i \in S} p_i \geq \nu(S) \quad \forall S \subseteq V$$

$$\sum_{i \in V} p_i = \nu(V)$$

$$p_i \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in V$$

Least Core



$$\nu(V) = 70 + 70 + 70 = 210$$


min ϵ

$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{i \in S} p_i \geq \nu(S) - \epsilon \quad \forall S \subseteq V$$

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An Outcome



$$\nu(V) = 210$$

$$\epsilon_1 = 70 - 2 \cdot 34 + 70 - 2 \cdot 24 = 24$$


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An Outcome



Problems with the Least Core:

- outcomes are **not unique**
- **Excess:** $p(S) - \nu(S)$ only controlled for worst coalitions

The Nucleolus

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And it is **unique!**

Hardness of Computing the Nucleolus

- Shortest Path Games
- Node-Weighted Matching
- Convex Games
- Spanning Tree Games
- Flow Games
- Weighted Voting Games
- Linear Production Games

Hardness of Computing the Nucleolus

In P

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NP-hard

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Open for over 10 years: How about Weighted Matching Games?

Hardness of Computing the Nucleolus

In P

- Shortest Path Games
- Node-Weighted Matching
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- **Our Result:** Matching Games

NP-hard

- Spanning Tree Games
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Maschler's Scheme

Solve a **hierarchy** of linear programs

$$P_1 \supseteq P_2 \supseteq \cdots \supseteq P_{|V|}$$


Subsequent LPs **minimize excess** over coalitions **not fixed**

Each LP **fixes** new coalitions \implies **dimension** reduces

Exponential size families of constraints in **naive formulation**


Study **structure of coalitions** with **max excess** \implies **polynomial** size formulations.

Universal Matchings



$$\bar{w}(uv) = w(uv) - p_u - p_v$$


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
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
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Find p with **universal** optimal matchings?

Lemma: \exists allocation p^* whose optimal matchings are universal.

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Observations

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Least Core Description

Lemma: \exists allocation p^* whose optimal matchings are **universal**.

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Other edges have ≤ 0 excess.

Theorem: These **linear constraints** are sufficient to describe Least Core

Least Core Description

Obtain a nice least core description

min ϵ

$$\begin{aligned} \text{s.t.} \quad & p(v) - p^*(v) = p(u) - p^*(u) && \text{for all } v, u \in S_i^*, i \in [k] \\ & p(e) - w(e) \leq 0 && \text{for all } e \in E^* \\ & p(e) - w(e) \geq 0 && \text{for all } e \in E^+ \\ & p(M^*) - w(M^*) = -\epsilon && M^* \text{ a universal matching} \\ & p(V) = \nu(G) \\ & p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Where S_1^*, \dots, S_k^* are maximal sets of \mathcal{L} ,

$$E^* := \left(\bigcup_{i \in [k]} E(S_i^*) \right) \cap \left(\bigcup_{M \in \mathcal{M}^*} M \right),$$

and E^+ is the edges with at most one endpoint each S_i^* .